Some of my speeches are here- the rest are in the diary pages—
August
NCA – Pindi branch – speaker
Pak Liberal Forum – speaker
Speeches delivered outside parliament in May 2008
- 1. Nuclear Asset protection at Islamabad universities
- 2. Constitutional reforms at UNDP Seminar in Islamabad
- 3. Afghanistan at the IRS Islamabad
- 4. Budget processes at Karachi Chamber of Commerce
- 5. Forest development at Pakistan Forest Institute in Peshawar
Nuclear Asset protection at Islamabad universities
It is a pleasure to be here at the University and to address the youth of Pakistan. I would like to address all of you on a subject which is close to all our hearts – our pride- Nuclear Pakistan.
There is no dearth of allegations in Western media that Pakistan’s nuclear assets are exposed to extremist control and that political instability in Pakistan is exposing the world to a disaster. Nothing could be further from the truth. Such fears are misguided and are either the result of lack of information or vested interests determined to destabilize Pakistan. With President Musharraf taking charge of governance in 1999, and Pakistan Muslim League subsequently at the helm of governance, the nuclear assets’ institutionalization was set as a key priority and in due course successfully accomplished. Recently the Carnegie Institute has confirmed that “the security of these assets has improved dramatically as a result of the protective measures put in place since the late 1990s”. This is no doubt an important recognition for Pakistan.
The history of Pakistan’s nuclear program dates to 1972 after the setback of the 1971 war with India. Real work started on it in 1975 after Indian tests of May 1974. Thus it can be seen as a reaction for security rather than a proactive provocation. In this period the program’s strength drew from its secrecy thus institutionalization was not a possibility. Come May 1998, the secrecy ended and after Indian nuclear tests, Pakistan entered the exclusive club, thus making institutionalization critical.
It is important for all to fully comprehend how the military and political leadership joined hands and implemented the institutionalization. Today Pakistan’s command & control of its nuclear assets is based on the following well planned Tiers: The National Command Authority (NCA) as Tier 1, the Strategic Plans Division (SPD) as Tier 2, and the Strategic Forces Commands (SFC) as Tier 3. Seeing the need to give legal cover to the NCA, The President promulgated the National Command Authority Ordinance 2007 last month.
Firstly, the NCA as Tier 1 comprises of the top ten political and military decision makers in Pakistan. Its objective as an apex decision making body is to formulate policy and centrally control all aspects of Pakistan’s nuclear capability including deployment. Its Chairman is the President, duly elected by parliament, and the Prime Minister is Vice-Chairman, directly elected by the people of Pakistan. Under the NCA come two committees. The Employment Control Committee (ECC) with its Deputy Chairman being the Foreign Minister and members being Minister for Defence, Interior and Finance on the political side; and the Joint Chief of all the services (CJCSC), the Army (COAS), Navy (CNS), Air Chief (CAS) on the military side. This balance between top military officers and elected representatives is critical for the NCA’s smooth functioning and credibility. The other committee is the Development Control Committee with the CJCSC being its Deputy Chairman and members being the COAS, CNS, CAS and heads of strategic scientific organizations. The SPD serves as secretariat for both.
Whilst the Employment Control Committee reviews latest information on threats, decides on appropriate response, gives policy directions, it also has the authority to order, control, and direct use of tri-services strategic forces during war. The Development Control committee as a subordinate committee of the NCA oversees the implementation of the decision of the ECC and exercises day to day technical, financial and administrative control over the strategic organizations. A quick glance through their members will confirm that extremist forces cannot enter this decision making grid at any point in Pakistan’s history. They are individuals who have been either elected or have risen up the ranks of military organizations. Extremists can definitely not enter this grid through elections as they have no representation within parliament as history shows. Pakistan’s voters have never allowed them any representation and religious parties who have been given representation by the people of Pakistan have disassociated themselves from such extremist elements.
Tier 2 is the Strategic Plans Division (SPD) which is the secretariat and the eyes and ears of the NCA. In this capacity it develops, manages all dimensions including operational planning, weapons development, arms control and disarmament affairs, command and control, storage, safety, security, budgets. The SPD functions directly under the President, the Prime Minister and the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee. The SPD has its own intelligence network which adds to the checks and balances of the system other than taking input from the main intelligence organizations. It has a special directorate for training and for monitoring the activities, the psychological well being, and the political affiliations of all the staff that have anything to do with the nuclear assets. The Security Division is by far the most intricate operation with its tentacles firmly grounded into maintaining an air tight secure, accident safe environment.
Tier 3 which is the Strategic Force Command at each service (Army, Navy, Air) maintains a strict military chain of command and hierarchy over the handling and operation of the nuclear weapons. The services retain training, technical, and administrative control over their Strategic Forces. With a specialized team within the armed forces dedicated for nuclear assets, the security is even tighter.
It is important to comment on the misperceptions about Pakistan’s armed forces that they can be infiltrated by extremist forces. The armed forces are a nearly 1 million force to be reckoned with: 620,000 regulars and 302,000 FC/Rangers. With their rich traditions of Muslim and British history, their professionalism, education, international exposure, they are above provincialism, sectarianism and politics. The strict discipline (through court martial ling if need be), constant monitoring and checks & balances ensure that extremist forces cannot manage any infiltration even remotely close to the nuclear assets.
Specifically on the monitoring activities of the nuclear related military personnel, the overwatch over the scientific community is very strict; with all visits and activities being tightly tracked. Retention of retiring staff for security and experience is another trend which works to their advantage. Daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly, reviews and inspections add to the intelligence systems which monitor for security, safety in terms of accidents, and potential pilferage, theft or loss. In short the SPD’s Personnel and Human Reliability Programs ensure ‘cradle to grave’ management of their staff. The Sensitive Material Control & Accounting has been designed in such a way that it meets international best practices. Needless to say that transportation security and specialist vehicles for assets is equally well managed and monitored. In terms of the famous Two Man Rule and Permissive Action Links it is clear that Pakistan’s physical safety mechanisms and firewalls are well equipped to deal with unauthorized usage attempts. And whilst many have commented on physical security of the assets, it is worth noting that the physical security concept is based on the principles of multiple layers, ‘defence in depth’ and an inherent ability to detect and defeat both insider and outsider threat. Through the use of surveillance tactics the reserve quick reaction force forms an important barrier for the nuclear emergency support team.
Regulation is equally important and in terms of institutionalization there is an organization called the Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority which overseas the safety of civilian nuclear facilities against radiation risks. The export of goods, technologies, material and equipment related to nuclear, biological weapons and their delivery systems, is well regulated under the Export Control Act of 2004. Since Pakistan unlike the developed countries does not have a nuclear industry in the private sector the controls are all within the public sector, which is an added advantage.
What is interesting to note about the Pakistan nuclear assets management is not just their professional institutionalization but also the fact that this information has recently been shared with local and foreign intelligentsia. Needless to say that this is due to the heavy media attention that the subject has received. However, it is worth noting that such transparency of information sharing is lacking in other nuclear states. Political leadership through parliamentary defence committee forum was one of the first to be briefed. This type of coordination between military and political parliamentary forces is a welcome step in the balance required between the two.
Nuclear asset management is a national priority and the pride of all Pakistanis. Its integrity and safety is a subject that unites all of Pakistan’s 160 million people without an iota of doubt. This unity is unanimous across the different provinces, religious sects, political parties, and socio-economic groups. This is not a subject which divides. Our strength as a developing nation derives from many socio-economic, political empowerment and military power indicators. Whilst some indicators like economic, judicial, media, and natural resource management, are likely to arouse vibrant debate depending on the political affiliations of an individual, nuclear management is hopefully free from all divisive insinuations. The reason is simple – The implications of the allegations against our nuclear program’s safe management are not lost on any Pakistani who values our territorial and sovereign integrity beyond everything. Pakistan Muslim League takes the lead in inviting all political forces to understand this reality and to work with the armed forces to support this institutionalization.
Parliament and the State in Pakistan: Case for Constitutional Reforms
MNA Marvi Memon – Pakistan Muslim League
Constitution making has historically been a prolonged and difficult process in Pakistan. The first Constitution was enacted nine years after independence. The 1973 Constitution, the fourth one was a consensus document which has stood the test of time. However even the best of Constitutions may have to be amended to cater to changed requirements – thus the amendments.
At the time of independence there was a perception that a strong centre was necessary for the strength and stability of Pakistan. With time and enhanced nation building the comfort level with moving towards provincial autonomy increased. And now we are at a stage where provincial autonomy demands by smaller provinces based on poverty, development, unemployment, issues are being actively discussed.
The Pakistan Muslim League has always played its constructive role for parliamentary democracy since the time of the Quaid. On Feb 19 2008 we decided to set our reservations aside on the veracity of the election results and accept them. We set a new tradition of political reconciliation and opened a new chapter for parliamentary democracy. Soon after that on March 29 2008, we decided to set another tradition by giving the Prime Minister the vote of confidence. In effect with this one move the PML united the entire nation behind the Prime Minister thus further adding to the Prime Minister and the ruling coalition’s powers.
Now the ball is in the court of the ruling coalition. It needs to honor its mandate. It needs to resolve the crisis of load shedding, electricity, devaluation, inflation, major daily commodity price hikes and the judiciary issue at war footing and fulfill its promises to the nation. Instead of the indecisiveness over pressing national issues and the political victimization against opposition we have witnessed in the last 50 days of their non governance, we expect the government to fulfill its responsibilities on all fronts. Despite the coalition’s high rhetoric on the supremacy of parliament it is a pity that the current crisis over judiciary and the decision to step out of cabinet was not discussed in parliament but elsewhere in close door meetings.
We as constructive opposition fully realize our responsibilities. We expect the ruling government to formally bring its constitutional reform package proposals to the National Assembly and then we will debate it and discuss it and give our party’s position on it. It is too early and at best hypothetical to give a party position on constitutional reforms before those who have been mandated to do so have not put them across. Our party has put together a committee on the subject with very senior legal experts as its members such as Senator Wasim Sajjad, Senator Bhinder, Senator Ranjha, and Senator SM Zaffar. This committee is deliberating on a package which will not just meet the expectations of the masses but go beyond their expectations unlike the indecisiveness shown by the coalition with its new tradition of rolling deadlines.
In the meantime before PML can give its response to the government’s constitutional reforms I wish to share with you some proposals that were put forward by our government in March 2005 on provincial autonomy and constitutional reforms, but which were not passed due to lack of consensus at the time.
The PML had proposed that the concurrent legislative list should be extensively reviewed and 27 of the 47 clauses be deleted from it thus giving provinces the powers. On the issue of criminal law, criminal procedure, civil procedure it was decided that these ought to be transferred to provinces if they don’t cover crimes such as narco production, smuggling, terrorism, transfer of arm and explosives across borders, human trafficking, illegal immigration, import and export and substandard goods.
On the issue of the Council of Common Interests it was decided that it was a vital body which should be made operational with potentially an amendment in the Constitution to making its meeting mandatory every six months. With regards to NFC we proposed that population should not be the sole criteria for distribution of taxes; other factors such as the extent of poverty stage of development and special needs of provinces should be taken into account.
Furthermore, it was proposed that provisions of Article 151 to 160 of the Constitution which deal with inter-provincial trade, Council of Common Interests, complaints about water supplies, National Economic Council, Electricity, Natural Gas, Broadcasting, and the National Finance Commission should be fully implemented in letter and spirit. Additionally an amendment was proposed to enable the Senate to make changes in the money bill subject to a final decision by the National Assembly.
The above are only a few issues which can form the basis of the debate on constitutional reforms. We take pride in the fact that it was the PML government which through the 17th amendment gave parliamentary democracy certain pro democracy empowerments such as reserved seats for women and minorities, intra party elections thus intra party democracy, defection clause to curb horse-trading and enhance parliamentary party discipline, and Local government.
It is now time for the coalition to put forward its constitutional package so that Pakistan Muslim League can give its pro democracy pro parliamentary supremacy input for the sake of the masses.
Afghanistan: Integration of counter insurgency, counter narcotics and development policies
By MNA Marvi Memon
(May 12, 2008 Institute of Regional Studies Seminar in Islamabad)
There can be no doubt in any political analyst or policy maker’s mind that until counter insurgency, counter narcotics and development policies are not reviewed in unison, there will continue to be unabated turmoil in neighbouring Afghanistan. For there to be progress on all three fronts a long term strategy needs to be formulated which recognizes the past shortcomings and encourages complete integration.
Counter insurgency
The counter insurgency tactics need to comprehend the nature of the neo Taliban movement. Other than employing modern technologies, taking advantage of the lack of order created by multinational forces, it is also a movement which has integrated the international jihadist movement, accepted free market orientation and has a firm belief in the Deobandi movement. The neo Talibans provide the populace with a cause that feeds off the lack of political representation given to Pushtuns. The lack of proportional Pushtun representation in the Afghan National Army is one such example which also feeds the insurgency. The Pushtuns are 40% of the population and yet only 32% of the officer cadre in the ANA. In contrast Tajiks are 25% of population and are 56% of the officer cadre. Such disparities need fixing if the root causes of insurgency are to be managed by the counter insurgency actors. Moreover the attacks on Pushtuns due to them being classified as Taliban sympathizers as corroborated by Human Rights Watch has made their sense of deprivation more acute pushing them closer to the insurgents. Pakistan has always maintained that this balance of representation is critical for peace in Afghanistan and that till the disenfranchisement issues are politically handled the neo Taliban movement is bound to gain momentum. Pakistan has urged for the inclusion of all political forces within the mainstream Afghan central government.
Other than an understanding of neo Taliban motivations, an understanding of what has weakened the state control is required. There is clearly no control of the state over most of its territories. The Ministry of Interior needs reform. The system has been geared for accommodating warlords with their own power base and not allowing functionaries who are loyal to the central government to consolidate its influence even in Kabul. Moreover it is reported that the administration is corrupt, arrogant, unskilled, doesn’t deliver basic services and is not creating its legitimacy. All these factors need to be addressed in the counter insurgency strategy.
The recruitment strategy of the Talibans also needs to be countered through an effective counter insurgency strategy. The approximate 7000 hardcore recruits and 10,000 non core village recruits need to be absorbed as part of the productive members of the state rather than being captured or killed.
Whilst the counter insurgency effort has been led by the US, many other Western nations have participated with various degrees of commitment. It is this lack of a cohesive ‘one team’ approach which has led to limited success in all the goals, be they military, development or anti-narcotic.
The shortcomings of the different actors launching the counter-insurgency need to be evaluated. A very important component of this effort is the National Service Directorate which is Afghanistan’s intelligence service estimated at 15,000 informers. They have had limited success due to their methods being largely traditional and technologically primitive; this has led them to penalizing local population and thus alienating them from central government and pushing them further towards the Taliban.
Mostly the common criticism made of foreign forces has been their reliance on massive air firepower, lack of attention for developing local knowledge and a failure to utilize knowledge due to swift rotations of their staff. The foreign forces have also been criticized for their attitudinal problems. 44 complaints were launched against US forces by AIHRC in June 2003-June 2004 period. And 113 the next year. Complaints revolved around lack of respect of locals, to recreational looting of agricultural fields to unauthorized access of homes. Such activities are counterproductive for any development initiatives that may be launched. The winning of hearts and minds under such conditions is not possible. Such issues need immediate attention if any integrated approach is to be expected.
The multinational character of the counter-insurgency forces has suffered from lack of unity of intents issues. There are many examples of the rifts showing lack of unity of intent but the one pitting the Germans against the Americans and British in 2006 within ISAF is most noteworthy. These rifts have added to the uncertainty thus instability and consequently the disillusionment of the population with the foreign forces. In the final analysis it is such lack of cohesion that also drives the population to support the Neo Talibans.
One such example of counter insurgency disunity resulting in counter narcotic inefficiencies is when British troops in Helmand avoided interfering with the eradication efforts (even abstaining from seizing opium) whilst in Kabul US officials were lobbying the government to start spraying poppy fields. The decision taken in this regard irritated British, Canadian and Dutch diplomats who tried to prevent adoption of aerial eradication. Such lack of unity is neither productive nor does it lead to increased security in the rural areas nor the strengthening of central government legitimacy.
The role of another counter-insurgency actor namely the Afghan military Forces (AMF) has also drawn criticism. Their militiamen were not effective as they were not being paid on time with food allowances being delayed as well. Their indiscipline, lack of clearly defined chain of command, primitive organization has caused serious issues. The other type of militia is the private armies of strongmen and governors. However since most of these governors did not have the means to recruit significant numbers there were shortcomings and lack of cohesiveness here as well. The next type of militia which attracted most criticism was the private security companies whose high handedness reduced the dividends of development. Finally the village militia which had the most potential for patrolling also lost its legitimacy due to poor funding.
All the above forces were plagued with corruption, indiscipline which added to the insurgency’s success. There are many examples of the police’s illegal activities some even in the narcotics side. These illegal activities in turn made the local population turn towards the Taliban since they could no longer expect law and order from the police. There is no doubt that the low pay structures of the police also ended up corroding the will and ability of the police to oppose the Taliban. Moreover, in the final analysis, it was the police’s own involvement in narcotic trade reduced their legitimacy.
The link of counter-insurgency and development efforts lies in the development approach whereby it is said that there is no point in trying to kill of all the fleas; the solution is to prevent fleas from infesting the dog by undermining conditions that would allow the fleas to breed. Thus development was meant to clean the country of insurgency. The fact that the development approach to counter insurgency was mixed with the traditional approach (which was periodic raids to prevent insurgents from consolidating their presence) meant that Talibans were able to develop their strongholds. Again the issue is the consistency of one approach. The dispensation of patronage combination with counter insurgency traditional mechanisms was patchy and inconsistent. Similarly on the narcotic side, even though there was high rhetoric of narcotic eradication, since this was combined with unbalanced action it did not produce the right results. In the Taliban days there was a significant decrease whilst now Afghanistan is leading the world opium production and cultivation efforts.
Similarly the problem of patronage policies has always been the inability of development aid reaching the right people. Early 2007 estimates of US and British defense officials clearly acknowledge that up to half the aid to Afghanistan failed to reach the target market. Authorities siphoned half of it and the rest was hoarded by village elders and not distributed to the villagers. These issues need better management.
It is also important to accept that whilst the Talibans have always been pursuing a policy of destabilization consistently, the counter-insurgency efforts have not been blessed with more than one year of a particular strategy being rolled out consistently. Frequent change in strategies has led to insurgents succeeding in their aims.
2008 is certainly a key year for the strengthening of the Afghan state. The Taliban are entrenched in the South, running parallel governments in several districts and controlling the majority of secondary roads. They have also been successful at hitting ‘soft’ Western civilian targets in Kabul. This has taken the insurgency efforts onto a higher danger level. The fact that the domestic and international actors have failed to counter the entrenchment of the insurgency in Afghanistan is problematic. Especially since elections need to be held on time which wont be possible if the Talibans are increasing their entrenchment. Their position on elections which are a sign of a stable state has been unequivocal. They have pledged violence in the event of elections being held on time. The UN could handle this situation by insisting on member states increasing security and counter insurgency efforts in Afghanistan.
Development policy
One of the key objectives of development policy carried out in Afghanistan should be to win the hearts and minds of the local population and to strengthen the state so as to minimize insurgency. The weakness of the state feeds the insurgency and thus all efforts are required to strengthen state institution across the entire geographical territory of Afghanistan.
The issue lies in the fact that the development process has to date been too centralised, top-heavy and insufficient. It has been prescriptive and supply-driven, rather than indigenous and responding to Afghan needs. As a result millions of Afghans, particularly in rural areas, still face severe hardship Conditions of persistent poverty have been a significant factor in the spread of insecurity as well as narco trade and narco lords.
There have been calls on the donors for improving the impact, efficiency, relevance and sustainability of aid. There needs to be stronger coordination and more even distribution of aid, greater alignment with national and local priorities and increased use of Afghan resources. Indicators of aid effectiveness should be established, and a commission to monitor donor performance is required which decreases the chances of pilferage theft and corruption. The integration of the refugees returning from Pakistan is actively required and so is the management of their drug abuse and rehabilitation issues. Donors need to cater sufficient resources for their movement, rehabilitation and development.
It is felt that government capacity to deliver development is weak and corruption is rampant which is hindering service delivery and undermining public confidence. Reforms are urgently required in public administration, anti-corruption and the rule of law. A rural development program is required which builds local government to deliver these very services thus channeling more funds directly to communities for development.
Agriculture is the mainstay of Afghanistan which supports 80% of the population. Agriculture diversification and substitution of drug cultivation is urgently required as a development and a counter narcotic strategy combined. It is a known fact that aggressive eradication and licensing are not useful counter narcotic strategies. Instead a long term sustainable development strategy which prioritizes support for substitute agricultural produce is urgently required. Additionally a greater outreach to community elders is required and firm action against major traffickers at all levels of the elite hierarchy is required.
No doubt it is the separation of US and NATO commands which creates inconsistencies in operating standards and gaps in counter insurgency methods. These need to be minimized. In the final analysis all positive development strategies need inclusion in the Afghan national Development Strategy.
What needs to be recognized is that the pace of reconstruction and development projects is not as slow as it is because of lack of funding, rather it is the lack of skilled workers which hinders utilizing of development funds in Ministries and adds to the delay. Aid agencies are also hindered in implementing their projects due to security considerations. Thus the integration of development areas and security zones away from the insurgency zones needs careful mapping.
However it is important to note that increasing development assistance without a better development strategy and corruption free delivery mechanism is useless since it will feed the bureaucratic corruption chain rather than add reconstruction and development value.
What is urgently required is support for institution strengthening, supporting parliament, supporting elections, an improved civil service, disarmament and reintegration of ex-combatants, a reformed national police force, so that development efforts complement counter insurgency and counter narcotic efforts.
Counter narcotics
The counter narcotic strategy implementation requires prioritized political will. The problem is serious as the quantum is fast increasing. Since 1991 Afghanistan has been the leading producer of opium and has now also become the main cultivator of the drug. The initial problem of counter narcotics strategy has been the statistically unknown quantum and the definition problem. This has made measurement of illicit drug use difficult and has made strategy formulation equally difficult.
The corruption within the narcotic control aid has made the positive efforts redundant as well. The typical sins of narcotics control plague Afghanistan in as much as they plague other countries. The sin of the politics of necessity being the first; the developing countries don’t necessarily attach priority to these problems. Second is the sin of politics of corruption typified by countries where politicians are either directly or indirectly involved in illicit activities particularly drug trade. Afghanistan is no exception. The third is the sin of politics of denial whereby developing countries blame western demand for the supply from their soils. Interestingly the US is not seen to be the destination of the Afghan supply thus many observers have commented on the lack of commitment of counter narcotics US efforts. Fighting a $3billion industry with a budget of few hundred million and not treating narcotics as long term development issue is a demonstration of the low priority US has attached this goal in Afghanistan.
The causes of drug usage in Afghanistan stem from poverty, a social environment resulting from two decades of civil war, violence. No doubt this does provide the populace with understandable set of motivations especially since war has caused deaths which have ravaged the family units, with the number of widows and orphans increasing. Survival strategies and rehabilitation institutions are sparsely spread due to lack of transparent funds. There is a vicious circle linking a weak state to narcotic strategies failing.
Interestingly the Taliban’s persecution of drug users produced a society where drug users could not be identified easily since they were underground for fear of persecution and thus remedial measures of health care were more problematic. Now that the persecution has reduced, this healthcare system has become victim of corruption instead. Additionally the complete ban by Taliban was a temporary policy which increased the debt burden of the Afghan farmers, whilst increasing the wealth for Talibans. Had this ban continued it is estimated that Taliban would have faced a revolt from debt ridden farmers.
There is no doubt that the strategy of compensation of opium poppy growers has led to an erosion of counter insurgency efforts as some of these funds have been directed through narco lords to sympathizers of ALQ. Moreover, the miltia involved in narco trafficking has further driven the populace away from the state towards the Taliban thus fueling the insurgency drive.
Considering the fact that one hectare of poppy requires approximately six times the number of person days of work, the substitution of other agricultural products needs to be developed as a viable commercial activity for the impoverished population. The problem is that opium unfortunately has become a non-perishable, low weight, high value item that represents a commodity for achieving food security. Its attractiveness as a reducer of hunger in a society where food is scarce adds to its value and so does the fact that in the cold and depressed environment its habitual intake is popular amongst the impoverished. There has been little effort made towards a sustainable policy to eliminate its cultivation.
Whilst the Afghan government has given a deadline in 2016 for opium poppy elimination, there is a strong likelihood of this being missed due to the nature of Afghan society: mental health problems, poverty, food insecurity, repression, social disruption, conflict, warlords, commanders, militias, opium farmers, drug traders, and lawlessness. These are all prevalent features which add to the lack of cohesion of counter insurgency and development efforts. Whilst there is no doubt of an Islamic connotation which discourages its use, this has not prevented its spread since time immemorial. Proper tracking mechanism and enforcement is the only solution, but again this possibility is mired due to the fact that counter insurgency weaknesses have reduced control of the central government in the entire country.
Firstly there is a need to adopt a comprehensive long term approach. Secondly strengthen the implementation of the National Drug Control Strategy. Thirdly reject proposals for aggressive eradication since small farmers cannot easily shift to alternative crops thereby accentuating poverty and driving them for protection towards Taliban. Fourthly, reject proposals for licensing cultivation for medical opiates since that confuses the elimination message and is useless due to no tracking methodology.
The problem with the new counter narcotic strategy formulated by US authorities is that it is based on the five pillars of improving public information, alternative development, eradication, law enforcement, and justice reform. It doesn’t take into consideration Afghanistan’s deteriorating security and volatile political situation. The US strategy is meant to fight the insurgents and the narcotics trade simultaneously which it cant do due to capacity issues. NATO is short of soldiers to fight the Talibans let alone fight narco lords. Whilst at best German helicopters can fly over large opium fields they are not in a position to physically enforce compliance due to shortage of resources. For this a tripling of military and police resources would be urgently required. The sad fact is that private militia belonging to narco lords and traffickers are better paid and equipped than the Afghan National Police which puts the police in conditions where they can be bribed by these militia.
Conclusion
Instead of linking counter narcotics to counter insurgency strategy, it would be prudent to link it to a comprehensive long-term development strategy. Narcotics in Afghanistan are not only a law enforcement issue. The central government is very far away from establishing its authority in rural far flung areas. Afghanistan is a traditional country, where the issue should be dealt locally rather than nationally. A fraction of financial resources which are available could be dedicated to empower traditional councils in villages and district levels, which could become good interlocutors between the government and local farmers in the context of an efficient and effective counter narcotics policy.
The link between counter narcotics, counter ‘insurgency’ and development policies needs better holistic mapping as well as a constant redefining for relevance. The ‘insurgency’ root causes need to be resolved eventually through the proportional political representation of all ethnic forces in Afghanistan including the Talibans. Counter narcotics requires the political will of the US and an inclusion of the long term sustainable policy within their priority lists. Development requires a strengthening of the state institutions and transparent delivery systems. None of these policy initiatives are possible without immediate and complete integration at all geographical levels. For the sake of an Afghanistan devoid of strife this integration is of immediate importance.
Speech at Pakistan Forest Institute May 2008
Forestry and environment are important for us as also for the whole world. Environmental issues, if properly taken up, can unite us all. Though in opposition, we have pledged that we would cooperate with the Government on matters of common interest. We would be criticizing the government not for the sake of opposition but as a ‘Constructive Opposition”. For example, environment-related matters are of concern to all of us. Therefore, our support would always be forthcoming. Being not very well versed with the intricacies of environment, I need your support and your guidance. Let me learn from you the experts so that we can contribute to this critical cause.
Compared to the world average of 30% forestation, we in Pakistan only have 4.8% area under forest cover. And this is what has bought me here to see what we can do to remedy the situation. It is my mission to see that this huge gap – between what we have as forest cover and what we should have – is filled; and filled soon. This of course, cannot be done in days; it would need years. But we need to continue working on this noble mission. Our PML government made its contributions and we will ensure the present government does so too.
The first Forest Policy was in 1955 – the latest in 2001. Our job, as parliamentarians, is to legislate: good legislation leads to good policy. A good forest policy has to be (i) sustainable; (ii) workable; and (iii) people-friendly.
Allah has blessed us with forest types that are diverse and varied; from the mangroves at the coasts of Sindh and Balochistan at sea level to the alpine pastures at 5,000m above sea level. This gift of nature is not to be wasted at the altar of our personal obsession with amassing ill-gotten money through the naked misuse of our forest wealth – a wealth that is already scarce.
Water, trees, and forests are the nature’s gifts to us that have direct benefits for us. Forests provide us timber, fuel wood, construction material, recreation, environmental rehabilitation, and more. Logically, therefore, depletion of this precious resource leads to increase in poverty. Let us not loose sight of the fact that forestry is a tool to poverty alleviation. After all, we have been empowered by our voters to do something for their poverty alleviation. The concept and message of forest conservation and sustainable usage should therefore, be to spread awareness and to make people have a change in their attitudes. Lack of education, awareness, realization, our general obsession with having more than our share, and above all, our lack of understanding the delicate balance the nature has so intricately crafted between the various components of forests and its allied biodiversity. These are some such reasons that are leading to our environmental degradation.
Awareness-raising against all these ills and above all, the timber mafia, like the land mafia, is a massive issue and needs to be taken up as such. Besides so many other actions, the rapport between the forest departments and the local governments needs to be developed and gradually strengthened; depending on the response and feedback obtained out of such a relationship.
One report, that struck me so much, was that the rate of deforestation in Northern Areas was so high that by the year 2010, complete deforestation would occur. This is simply unacceptable. This report made me drive to Peshawar this morning. We must act fast to arrest this downward spiral.
I would like to find the solutions to such problems from you the experts and then try and resolve your issues by discussing them on the floor of the house.
The areas of NWFP, AJK and Northern Areas are the least developed in Pakistan. There are 8.21 million people over 113,000km2 area. They lack development. Forestry and poverty in the context of northern Pakistan have a direct linkage. The present government needs to address this issue on priority basis. They have a per capita electricity consumption of 0.05 KW. Generation is 46MW and demand 95MW. It is this gap which needs to be fixed urgently and better forestation policy can contribute to its reduction.
My mission and pledge to my people is that I want 25 million trees grown and successfully established in five years. I also want that we don’t ignore the need for effective monitoring mechanism. Trees may not be just forest trees: these could be a mix of forest, construction, fuel and fruit trees, and trees that could also control soil erosion and wind erosion.
I am in total agreement with the PFI and its objectives. Especially the one about making PFI a centre of excellence. We also need to increase the number and quality of researchers. We need to see to it that vacancies at the PFI are filled without any further loss of time.
I was appalled to see that more than 80% budget of the PFI goes for salaries and other peripheral functions while a negligible fraction of the budget is available for research. I will urge the government to enhance the PFI budget by at least 50%. This incremental budget must exclusively go for research and experimentation. This way, the latent talent of our researchers would come out and contribute positively towards the noble goal of conservation and sustainable usage of natural renewable resources of Pakistan.
There is a Hadith Sharif the gist of which is that on Judgment Day, if you have a sapling, plant it and be rewarded. Yet another Hadith Sharif says in terms of war ethics: destruction of women, children, old people and the destruction of trees, is not allowed. Let’s stop paying lip service to our great religion. Let’s act as commandeered by the last Prophet of Allah (PBUH).
To me, the foremost thing that could lead us on the path to salvation, would be raising of awareness in the different sections of the civil society: in schoolchildren, in parliamentarians, in business community, in civil society and any other group that has stakes in forests and in its conservation.
If initiated right away, forest ventures could immediately generate thousand of jobs: precious jobs that would deter the local poor people from cutting trees any further. Coupled with massive plantation campaigns, I am sure that we could do wonders to our fragile environment.
In the end, I thank you all for being here and for giving me such a lot of information. I am especially impressed and enthused by the idea of transforming the PFI in to a Center of Excellence in Forestry. I will see to it that this idea is transformed in to reality.
